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FROM CONCEIVABLE TO IMPOSSIBLE: THE 
HURDLES PLAINTIFFS MUST OVERCOME 
WHEN PLEADING SECTION 11 AND SECTION 
12(A) SECURITIES CLAIMS 
INTRODUCTION 
After the stock market crashed in 1929, Congress took measures to 
protect investors in securities markets.1 Concerned about manipulation and 
deception in these markets,2 and based on President Roosevelt’s New Deal 
platform,3 Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)4 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),5 which regulate 
securities markets through mandatory disclosure.6 In order to ensure 
accurate disclosures,7 this new legislation included a number of measures—
among them, § 10(b) of the Exchange Act (§ 10(b)), and § 11 and § 12(a) of 
the Securities Act (§ 11 and § 12(a), respectively).8 
Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to “use or employ” any manipulation 
or deception in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.9 Pursuant 
to this section, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
promulgated Rule 10b-5, which describes the range of conduct prohibited 
by § 10(b).10 In 1971, the Supreme Court established a private right of 
action against those who engaged in conduct prohibited by Rule 10b-5.11 
Plaintiffs in these private securities actions must state their claims of fraud 
with particularity, per Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP)12 and, after 1995, § 21D(b)(1) of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (PSLRA).13 
Unlike § 10(b), which requires some form of fraudulent intent,14 § 11 
and § 12(a) impose strict liability for material misstatements.15 Specifically, 
                                                                                                                                          
 1. See Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities Fraud, 61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 65 
(2009). 
 2. See id. at 65–66. 
 3. See id. at 65. 
 4. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006)). 
 5. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2006)). 
 6. See Colombo, supra note 1. 
 7. See id. 
 8. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a) (2006); Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 10. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010); Colombo, supra note 1, at 66. 
 11. Colombo, supra note 1, at 67 (citation omitted). 
 12. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 13. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 21D(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) 
(2006). The Supreme Court further heightened the level of specificity with which a plaintiff must 
allege securities fraud through its interpretation of provisions of the PSLRA in both Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005), and Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007). 
 14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 15. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a) (2006). 
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§ 11 creates civil liabilities for false information contained in a registration 
statement.16 Likewise, § 12(a) establishes civil liabilities against those who 
offer or sell securities based on untrue statements of material facts 
contained in prospectuses17 and other communications.18 Neither § 11 nor  
§ 12(a) requires scienter;19 a plaintiff must only show that the untrue 
statements were material.20 However, while no intent on the part of the 
defendant is required for claims arising under § 11 and § 12(a), courts have 
often applied the heightened pleading standards necessary for a § 10(b) 
action to § 11 and § 12(a) claims.21 
Furthermore, recent Supreme Court decisions, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, have increased the burden of pleading on 
plaintiffs in all civil suits, making it exceedingly difficult for private 
securities claims to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
FRCP (Rule 12(b)(6) motion).22 Previously, a pleading demonstrating that 
an alleged claim was conceivable based on a set of facts would suffice.23 
However, after Twombly and Iqbal, plaintiffs must show that allegations are 
at least plausible according to the pled facts.24 While the PSLRA was 
                                                                                                                                          
 16. See id. § 77k. Per § 2(a)(8) (and by reference, § 6) of the Securities Act, a “registration 
statement” is a statement filed with the SEC in connection with the registration of securities. See 
id. §§ 77b(a)(8), 77f. 
 17. In general, a “prospectus” is “any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or 
communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms 
the sale of any security.” Id. § 77b(a)(10). 
 18. See id. § 77l(a). 
 19. Scienter is the “mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94 n.12 (1976). See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 
459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (“If a plaintiff purchased a security issued pursuant to a registration 
statement, he need only show a material misstatement or omission to establish his prima facie 
case.”); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Section 12 
turns on status, not scienter: It imposes liability without requiring ‘proof of either fraud or 
reliance.’” (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 582 (1995))). 
 20. See discussion infra Parts I.B–C. See also infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 21. See, e.g., Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2004); In re Bare Escentuals, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 09-3268 PJH, 2010 WL 3893622, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2010). 
 22. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 23. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
 24. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
[After Twombly and Iqbal,] pleadings must undergo a test not for factual detail, but for 
factual . . . convincingness. . . . Because plausibility requires the plaintiff to plead 
particularized facts and maybe even some evidence, the federal pleading product will 
usually not look much different from a complaint in a heightened-fact-pleading regime. 
Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 821, 832–33 (2010). 
[P]lausibility is not simply a measure of whether the plaintiff has created a permissible 
inference; rather, it is a freestanding inquiry into whether the pleader’s claims in toto 
are plausible. Thus, even in a case in which plaintiff has averred direct evidence of his 
entitlement to relief, the court would still consider whether he has made out a plausible 
claim. 
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enacted to prevent plaintiffs from bringing frivolous suits that could both 
harm the reputation of innocent defendants and incentivize some defendants 
to settle—given the cost of litigating an otherwise frivolous claim25—lower 
courts have used the heightened pleading standard set forth in Twombly and 
Iqbal to summarily dismiss securities claims for inadequacies in pleading 
prior to the opportunity for discovery.26 
It is this note’s position that the application of § 10(b) fraud pleading 
standards and of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions to § 11 and § 12(a) 
claims creates an exceedingly strict pleading standard for plaintiffs to 
overcome. An analysis of recent court decisions, current trends in securities 
litigation, and limitations imposed by the provisions of these sections will 
highlight the significance of these changes to the pleading standards for § 
11 and § 12(a) claimants. Ultimately, this note will suggest possible 
solutions to prevent these claims from being summarily dismissed by Rule 
12(b)(6) motions. 
Part I of this note will address the courts’ application of pleading 
standards for § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claims to § 11 and § 12(a) claims when 
the claims “sound in fraud.” The court’s use of the heightened pleading 
standard of plausibility from Twombly and Iqbal to summarily dismiss 
cases before plaintiffs have had any opportunity for discovery will be 
explored in Part II. Part III will analyze the significance of these heightened 
pleading standards—presented in connection with § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 
claims and by Twombly and Iqbal—on the ability of private litigants to seek 
relief under § 11 and § 12(a). Finally, Part IV will propose remedies which 
may assist § 11 and § 12(a) claimants in their efforts to survive dismissal. 
I. APPLYING § 10(B)/RULE 10B-5 PLEADING STANDARDS TO 
§ 11 AND § 12(A) CLAIMS 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it illegal to manipulate or 
deceive others in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.27 In 
order to bring a suit under § 10(b) for manipulative or deceptive conduct, a 
plaintiff must plead that the defendant acted with fraudulent intent,28 and as 
necessary for any complaint of fraud, her plea must be stated with 
particularity, as required by Rule 9(b) of the FRCP.29 Differing from  
§ 10(b), § 11 and § 12(a) of the Securities Act impose strict liability for 
material misstatements; no intent to deceive is required.30 However, the vast 
                                                                                                                                          
Allan R. Stein, Confining Iqbal, 45 TULSA L. REV. 277, 292 (2009). 
 25. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
 26. See, e.g., Detroit Gen. Ret. Sys. v. Medtronic, Inc., 621 F.3d 800, 804–05 (8th Cir. 2010); 
Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 347 F. App’x 617, 619 (2d Cir. 2009); South 
Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 28. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 30. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a) (2006). 
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majority of the circuit courts in the United States have applied the fraud 
pleading standards to § 11 and § 12(a) claims when a claim under § 10(b) is 
also alleged in the complaint.31 
A. SECTION 10(B) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT  
Section 10(b) makes it “unlawful . . . to use or employ, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance.”32 In order to succeed with a § 10(b) claim, a 
plaintiff must prove materiality, scienter, a purchase or sale of a security, 
reliance, and causation of an economic loss.33 In TSC Industries, Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., the Supreme Court set the general standard of materiality: 
“[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to 
vote.”34 The plaintiff must also prove the defendant’s scienter—i.e. the 
“mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.”35 The 
PSLRA requires the pleading to provide a “strong inference” of the 
defendant’s necessary intent.36 In addition, § 10(b) requires that the 
manipulation or deception be used “in connection with the purchase or sale 
of [a] security” for the section to apply.37 Furthermore, to satisfy reliance, 
the plaintiff must demonstrate that she justifiably relied on the false 
information provided by the defendant.38 Finally, the plaintiff then needs to 
                                                                                                                                          
 31. See discussion infra Part I.D. 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). From § 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, which describes the 
range of conduct prohibited by § 10(b). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010); Colombo, supra note 1, 
at 66. 
 33. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). See also Michael J. 
Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Resolving the Continuing Controversy Regarding Confidential 
Informants in Private Securities Fraud Litigation, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 637, 642 
(2010). 
 34. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 35. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94 n.12 (1976). 
 36. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) 
(2006). Section 21D(b)(2) of the PSLRA states the following: 
  In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover 
money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, 
the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, 
state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind. 
 Id. 
  In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., the Supreme Court recently interpreted the 
meaning of “strong inference” in § 21D(b)(2) of the PSLRA. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007) (“To qualify as ‘strong’ within the intendment of § 
21D(b)(2), [the Supreme Court held that] an inference of scienter must be more than merely 
plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of 
nonfraudulent intent.”). 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 38. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). In Basic, the Supreme Court 
articulated the “fraud on the market theory” of reliance. Id. at 241–42. 
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prove loss causation—i.e. the plaintiff suffered a loss as a result of the 
defendant’s false statements.39 
B. SECTION 11 OF THE SECURITIES ACT 
Section 11 imposes civil liabilities for untrue information contained in a 
registration statement.40 It establishes a cause of action where a registration 
statement “contain[s] an untrue statement of a material fact or omit[s] to 
state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the 
statements therein not misleading.”41 Liability for such false information 
does not fall only on the issuer of the registration statement.42 Rather, in 
addition to bringing an action against the issuer, the person acquiring 
securities in connection with the inaccurate information contained in the 
registration statement can sue: (1) “every person who signed the registration 
                                                                                                                                          
Succinctly put: 
  “The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and 
developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is determined by the 
available material information regarding the company and its business. . . . Misleading 
statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not 
directly rely on the misstatements. . . . The causal connection between the defendant’s 
fraud and the plaintiffs’ purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a 
case of direct reliance on misrepresentations.” 
Id. (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)). See also In re Initial Pub. 
Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 42 (2d Cir. 2006); Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 
731–32 (7th Cir. 2004); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on 
the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 917–22 (1989). See generally Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market 
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990). 
 39. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 (discussing how loss causation is the “requisite causal 
connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s injury”). The Supreme Court 
has recently further clarified what “loss causation” entails. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 
336, 342–47 (2005). Thus, in fraud on the market cases, 
an inflated purchase price will not itself constitute or proximately cause the relevant 
economic loss. . . .  
. . . 
  Given the tangle of factors affecting price, the most logic alone permits us to say is 
that the higher purchase price will sometimes play a role in bringing about a future loss. 
It may prove to be a necessary condition of any such loss, and in that sense one might 
say that the inflated purchase price suggests that the misrepresentation . . . “touches 
upon” a later economic loss. . . . But, even if that is so, it is insufficient. To “touch 
upon” a loss is not to cause a loss, and it is the latter that the law requires. 
Id. at 342–43. Ultimately, in Dura, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must “provide a 
defendant with some indication of the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in 
mind”—i.e. § 21D(b)(4) of the PSLRA requires a plaintiff to plead loss causation, rather than 
prove it throughout the course of the lawsuit. See id. at 347; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006). 
 40. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006). 
 41. Id. § 77k(a). 
 42. See id. 
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statement” (e.g. officers of the issuer); (2) every director of or partner in the 
issuer; (3) “every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or [other professional] 
. . . who has . . . certified any [information] . . . which is used in connection 
with the registration statement”; and (4) “every underwriter.”43 
Furthermore, under § 11, the plaintiff need not prove any intent on the 
defendant’s part.44 The Supreme Court has held that “[i]f a plaintiff 
purchased a security issued pursuant to a registration statement, he need 
only show a material misstatement or omission to establish his prima facie 
case.”45 When determining materiality, courts consider whether the 
information would have misled a “reasonable investor” in evaluating the 
investment.46 In addition, the plaintiff must show that the securities were, in 
fact, purchased pursuant to the allegedly misleading registration 
statement.47 To do so, circuit courts have held “that the plaintiff must 
directly trace his or her security to the allegedly defective registration 
statement at issue in the case.”48 Moreover, while § 11 imposes civil 
liability on essentially any person connected to the registration statement49 
and requires no intent,50 the damages that a plaintiff can recover under the 
statute are limited to the difference between the purchase price of the 
securities and either the price at which the plaintiff sold the securities or the 
value of the securities at the time of the suit.51 Section 11 claims can also 
only be brought up to one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or 
one year after the point in time when a reasonably diligent person would 
have discovered the misstatement.52 
C. SECTION 12(A) OF THE SECURITIES ACT 
Section 12(a) creates civil liabilities against any person who offers 
securities “by means of a prospectus or oral communication” which 
contains an “untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements . . . not misleading.”53 
Similar to § 11, securities litigants bringing actions under § 12(a) do not 
                                                                                                                                          
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. § 77k. See also Lee v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 294 F.3d 969, 977 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 45. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983). 
 46. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs., 
P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759, 761 (2d Cir. 1991). See also Akerman v. Oryx 
Commc’ns, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 363, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 47. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k; Lee, 294 F.3d at 977. 
 48. Lee, 294 F.3d at 977. See DeMaria v. Andersen, 318 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 49. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
 50. See id.; Lee, 294 F.3d at 977. 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). 
 52. Id. § 77m. 
 53. Id. § 77l(a). 
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need to prove the defendant’s scienter.54 The plaintiff simply must 
demonstrate that the untrue information would be material to a “reasonable 
investor.”55 As with § 11, § 12(a) limits the remedies available to the 
rescission of the purchase of securities, or if the purchase cannot be 
rescinded (i.e. the purchaser no longer owns the shares), then rescissory 
damages.56 Section 12(a) claims can also only be brought up to one year 
after the inaccurate information was discovered, or should reasonably have 
been discovered.57 
Nonetheless, § 12(a) differs from § 11 in two significant ways. First, 
under § 12(a), the purchaser can only sue the “seller” of the securities.58 
Whereas § 11 allows the purchaser to bring an action against any person 
who may be connected to the registration statement,59 § 12(a) limits the 
litigious scope to those who “either passed title to the securities or solicited 
the sale of the securities.”60 Some courts have interpreted this definition 
broadly, holding that a “purchaser must demonstrate direct and active 
participation in the solicitation of the immediate sale to hold the issuer 
liable as a § 12(2) seller.”61 However, most courts take a narrower view, 
requiring the defendant to have “directly communicate[d]” with the 
plaintiff-buyer.62 
Second, § 12(a) allows only those purchasers in direct privity with the 
seller to sue.63 As a result, secondary market purchasers have no cause of 
action against the initial seller.64 Likewise, depending on how many of the 
initial purchasers sell their securities in the market for profit, there may be 
relatively few plaintiffs who could actually sue under § 12(a).65 These 
differences may be explained by the distinct scope of § 11 and § 12(a).66 
                                                                                                                                          
 54. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Section 
12 turns on status, not scienter: It imposes liability without requiring ‘proof of either fraud or 
reliance.’” (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 582 (1995))). 
 55. See Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 178 n.11 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing I. Meyer Pincus & 
Assocs., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759, 761 (2d Cir. 1991)) (“The test for whether a 
statement is materially misleading under Section 12(a)(2) is identical to that under Section 10(b) 
and Section 11: whether representations, viewed as a whole, would have misled a reasonable 
investor.”). 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a). 
 57. Id. § 77m. 
 58. Id. § 77l(a). 
 59. Id. § 77k. 
 60. In re Metro. Sec. Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1295 (E.D. Wash. 2007) (citing Moore v. 
Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir. 1989); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 643 
(1988)). 
 61. In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Moore, 885 F.2d at 
536–37). 
 62. See Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 871 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 63. See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a); Michele Odorizzi, Liability for Securities Law Violations, 1757 
PLI/CORP. 163, 176 (2009). 
 64. See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a); Odorizzi, supra note 63. 
 65. See Odorizzi, supra note 63. 
 66. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a). 
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While liability under § 11 is limited to material misstatements or omissions 
in a particular offering document, a registration statement,67 § 12(a) focuses 
on misrepresentations made by a certain party, the seller.68 Thus, the 
requirements of direct and active communication by, and direct privity 
with, the seller are necessary to prevent the seller from facing liability to 
individuals with whom the seller had no direct communication or direct 
privity.69 
D. CROSS-APPLYING THE § 10(B) PLEADING STANDARDS TO § 11 
AND § 12(A) CLAIMS 
Since neither § 11 nor § 12(a) involve an element of fraud,70 complaints 
filed under these sections typically need to meet the pleading standards 
contained in Rule 8 of the FRCP.71 However, when these claims accompany 
a § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim, many courts will require these claims to satisfy 
Rule 9(b) of the FRCP, as well as § 21D(b)(1) of the PSLRA, which are 
typically applied to § 10(b) cases.72 In these instances, the courts contend 
that the § 11 and § 12(a) claims “sound in fraud,” and thus, should be 
evaluated using the heightened pleading standards applicable to § 10(b) to 
survive.73 Only the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals finds it improper to 
apply the heightened pleading standards to § 11 and § 12(a) claims because 
these claims do not require any element of fraud in order to establish 
liability.74 The Eight Circuit contends that a “pleading standard which 
requires a party to plead particular facts to support a cause of action that 
does not include fraud or mistake as an element comports neither with 
                                                                                                                                          
 67. Id. § 77k. 
 68. Id. § 77l(a). 
 69. See id.; Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 871 (5th Cir. 2003); Odorizzi, supra 
note 63. 
 70. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 71. See, e.g., Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 347 F. App’x 617, 619–21 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (evaluating plaintiff’s § 11 and § 12(a) claims “under Rule 8, not Rule 9(b), because 
[the] plaintiff allege[d] negligent preparation of the registration statement and prospectus, rather 
than fraudulent preparation.” (citing Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 171, 178 (2d Cir. 2004))). 
 72. See, e.g., Ind. State Dist. Council of Laborers & Hod Carriers Pension & Welfare Fund v. 
Omnicare, Inc., 583 F.3d 935, 948 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 2010 WL 5638596 (Nov. 5, 
2010); Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharm. Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 629 (4th Cir. 2008); ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. 
v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d 46, 68 (1st Cir. 2008); Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 
1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006); In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2004); Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb 
Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 160–61 (3d Cir. 2004). Cf. Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky’s Inc., 
238 F.3d 363, 368–69 (5th Cir. 2001); Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 892–93 (7th Cir. 1990). But 
see Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1251–52 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 73. See cases cited supra note 72. 
 74. See In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.3d 309, 314 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he 
particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) does not apply to claims under § 11 of the Securities Act, 
because proof of fraud or mistake is not a prerequisite to establishing liability under § 11.”). 
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Supreme Court precedent nor with . . . the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”75 
II. SECTION 11 AND SECTION 12(A) PLEADING STANDARDS 
FOLLOWING TWOMBLY AND IQBAL 
In Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court heightened the pleading 
burden in all civil suits, requiring that the pled facts support allegations that 
are not only conceivable but plausible.76 This shift to plausibility has made 
surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss increasingly difficult for 
private securities claims.77 While many securities claims already face 
heightened pleading standards—under Rule 9(b) of the FRCP78 and under 
§ 21D(b)(1) of the PSLRA79—this change from conceivability to 
plausibility has both confused the courts80 and led them to summarily 
dismiss securities claims for inadequacies in pleading prior to affording the 
plaintiff an opportunity for discovery.81 
A. PRE-TWOMBLY PLEADING STANDARD 
1. Conley v. Gibson 
Prior to Twombly, the standard for pleading was “notice pleading,” set 
by the Court in Conley v. Gibson.82 In Conley, African-American 
employees of the Texas and New Orleans Railroad brought an action 
against their union, the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 
alleging that the union had failed to adequately represent them relative to 
other union members.83 The union filed a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim for which relief can be granted.84 The District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas granted the motion, and the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed the decision.85 
                                                                                                                                          
 75. Id. at 315. 
 76. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007). 
 77. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 78. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 79. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 21D(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) 
(2006). 
 80. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 191 
(2010). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 535; Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 24; Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of 
Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2010); Stein, 
supra note 24; John P. Sullivan, Twombly and Iqbal: The Latest Retreat from Notice Pleading, 43 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 81. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 82. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
 83. See id. at 43. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. at 43–44. 
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On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling.86 With respect to the 
adequacy of the complaint, the Court held that a motion to dismiss should 
not be granted “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove 
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”87 
However, “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to 
set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.”88 Instead, “all the 
Rules require is ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the 
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon 
which it rests.”89 The standard of “notice pleading” afforded plaintiffs the 
opportunity for discovery as long as they could conceivably prove the facts 
underlying their claims.90 
2. Rule 9(b) of the FRCP 
Until recently in Iqbal, Conley’s “notice pleading” applied generally to 
all civil actions.91 However, for cases involving fraud, the FRCP prescribed 
a greater burden on plaintiffs’ pleadings.92 Rule 9(b) of the FRCP requires 
that, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”93 This increased level of 
specificity offers assurance that the plaintiff has at least some factual basis 
when alleging fraud.94 
3. Section 21D(b)(1) of the PSLRA 
While Rule 9(b) of the FRCP does apply to securities fraud cases, 
Congress enacted certain provisions of the PSLRA pertaining to the 
particularity necessary for securities fraud claims.95 Concerned about 
abusive litigation practices, Congress sought to protect investors and 
safeguard capital markets from the impact of frivolous lawsuits.96 
                                                                                                                                          
 86. See id. at 48. 
 87. Id. at 45–46. 
 88. Id. at 47. 
 89. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
 90. See id. at 47–48. 
 91. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007); Conley, 355 U.S. 41. 
 92. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Miller, supra note 80, at 189–90. 
 95. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 21D(b)(1)–(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 96. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
The House and Senate Committees heard evidence that abusive practices committed in 
private securities litigation include: (1) the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of 
securities and others whenever there is a significant change in an issuer’s stock price, 
without regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and with only faint hope that 
the discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible cause of action; (2) the 
targeting of deep pocket defendants, including accountants, underwriters, and 
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Specifically, § 21D(b)(1) requires that a securities fraud complaint “specify 
each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why 
the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or 
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with 
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”97 Unlike Rule 9(b), 
which mandates particularity in a complaint generally,98 § 21D(b)(1) of the 
PSLRA demands particularity with respect to specific elements of a 
securities fraud allegation.99 Even so, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the PSLRA is even more restrictive and burdensome to the plaintiff when 
pleading.100 
B. BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V. TWOMBLY 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly overturned fifty years of judicial 
precedent concerning “notice pleading.”101 In Twombly, consumers filed a 
class action lawsuit against “incumbent local exchange carriers” (ILECs) 
for allegedly engaging in activities that violated the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.102 The complainants argued that the ILECs conspired to restrict trade 
activities in two ways: (1) the ILECs “engaged in parallel conduct” to limit 
the growth of “competitive local exchange carriers” (CLECs); and (2) the 
ILECs agreed to not compete with one another.103 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the 
action for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.104 Even 
though there was parallel business behavior among the ILECs, the district 
court held that “allegations of parallel business conduct, taken alone, do not 
state a claim under [the Sherman Antitrust Act]; plaintiffs must allege 
additional facts that ‘ten[d] to exclude independent self-interested conduct 
as an explanation for defendants’ parallel behavior.’”105 The plaintiffs 
appealed, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court’s decision, finding that it had applied the wrong standard when 
                                                                                                                                          
individuals who may be covered by insurance, without regard to their actual culpability; 
(3) the abuse of the discovery process to impose costs so burdensome that it is often 
economical for the victimized party to settle; and (4) the manipulation by class action 
lawyers of the clients whom they purportedly represent. 
Id. 
 97. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1). 
 98. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1). 
 100. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007) (clarifying  
§ 21D(b)(2) of the PSLRA); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005) 
(interpreting § 21D(b)(4) of the PSLRA). 
 101. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 102. See id. at 548–50. 
 103. Id. at 550–51. 
 104. See id. at 552. 
 105. Id. (quoting Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
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evaluating the complaint.106 The Second Circuit stated, “‘to rule that 
allegations of parallel anticompetitive conduct fail to support a plausible 
conspiracy claim, a court would have to conclude that there is no set of 
facts that would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular 
parallelism asserted was the product of collusion rather than 
coincidence.’”107 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s ruling.108 
In the majority opinion, Justice Souter considered what must be pled under 
Rule 8(a)(2) of the FRCP.109 Rejecting “notice pleading” as outdated,110 
Souter argued that the Court does “not require heightened fact pleading of 
specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face.”111 However, the Court was careful to note that a plausible basis 
does not equate to a probability standard.112 Justice Stevens dissented, 
commenting that “[w]hether the Court’s action will benefit only defendants 
in antitrust treble-damages cases, or whether its test for the sufficiency of a 
complaint will inure to the benefit of all civil defendants, is a question that 
the future will answer.”113 
C. PRE-IQBAL SECURITIES CASES APPLYING TWOMBLY 
In Twombly, the Supreme Court did not articulate whether the holding 
applied to all cases, or just antitrust cases.114 Amid this ambiguity, some 
courts began applying the plausibility standard from Twombly to securities 
cases.115 Fewer than two months after the Court decided Twombly, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, citing the case, required a plaintiff 
bringing a securities fraud action to “provide the grounds upon which his 
claim rests through factual allegations sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level.’”116 This language by itself does not necessarily 
                                                                                                                                          
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 553 (quoting Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 557. 
 110. See id. at 561–63. 
 111. Id. at 570. 
 112. See id. at 556. 
 113. Id. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 114. See id. 
 115. See, e.g., Stark Trading v. Falconbridge Ltd., 552 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2009); Cozzarelli v. 
Inspire Pharm. Inc., 549 F.3d 618 (4th Cir. 2008); ATSI Commc’ns v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 
87 (2d Cir. 2007); Coronel v. Quanta Capital Holdings Ltd., No. 07 Civ. 1405 (RPP), 2009 WL 
174656 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2009); In re Scottish Re Group Sec. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 370 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 116. ATSI, 493 F.3d at 98 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Two judges in the Southern 
District of New York also applied the Twombly standard to securities fraud claims. See Coronel, 
2009 WL 174656, at *10; Scottish Re Group, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 382. Interestingly, Coronel 
applies Rule 8 of the FRCP to § 11 and § 12(a) claims whereas Scottish Re Group applies Rule 
9(b) of the FRCP to § 11 and § 12(a) claims. Compare Coronel, 2009 WL 174656, at *12. 
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suggest that the court was adopting the plausibility standard.117 However, in 
a footnote which cites the circuit court opinion in Iqbal, the Second Circuit 
commented that it was reading the plausibility standard as applicable 
beyond antitrust cases.118 In the two years after Twombly, the Fourth Circuit 
and the Seventh Circuit also interpreted Twombly as reaching beyond the 
scope of antitrust.119 
D. ASHCROFT V. IQBAL 
Following the Twombly decision, it was unclear whether the “plausible” 
pleading standard applied outside the antitrust context.120 Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
                                                                                                                                          
  A plaintiff may establish Section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims by alleging only negligence. 
. . . Where the underlying allegations sound solely in negligence, the applicable 
pleading standard is set forth in Rule 8(a), under which, a “complaint is sufficient if it 
alleges [plausible grounds] that the registration statement contains a material 
misstatement or omission.” 
Id. (quoting In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 358 F. Supp. 2d 189, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)), 
with Scottish Re Group, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 387 (“Although fraud ‘is not an element or a requisite 
to a claim under Section 11 or Section 12(a)(2),’ those claims ‘may be—and often are—predicated 
on fraud.’ In such circumstances, Rule 9(b), which applies to ‘all averments of fraud,’ will be 
applied.”) (quoting Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 117. See, e.g., ATSI, 493 F.3d at 98 (holding that “[t]o survive dismissal, the plaintiff must 
provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient ‘to raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 
 118. Footnote 2 in ATSI reads as follows:  
We have declined to read Twombly’s flexible “plausibility standard” as relating only to 
antitrust cases. . . . “Some of [Twombly’s] language relating generally to Rule 8 
pleading standards seems to be so integral to the rationale of the Court’s parallel 
conduct holding as to constitute a necessary part of that holding.” 
ATSI, 493 F.3d at 98 n.2 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 119. See Stark Trading, 552 F.3d at 574 (“[T]he complaint in a complex case must, to avert 
dismissal for failure to state a claim, include sufficient allegations to enable a judgment that the 
claim has enough possible merit to warrant the protracted litigation likely to ensue from denying a 
motion to dismiss.”) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544); Cozzarelli, 549 F.3d at 630 (“Because 
plaintiffs have not provided credible explanations of the falsity of these statements, we have 
serious doubts that plaintiffs have even ‘nudged the[se] claims across the line from conceivable to 
plausible,’ as required by the minimal pleading standards of Rule 8.”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 
at 570). 
 120. See Ryan Mize, Comment, From Plausibility to Clarity: An Analysis of the Implications of 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Possible Remedies, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1246 (2010). 
Less than one month after Twombly, the Supreme Court in Erickson v. Pardus applied 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) in traditional fashion, citing the “fair notice” 
standard enunciated in Conley. Although Erickson involved a pro se prisoner alleging 
civil rights violations, a vastly different situation than Twombly, the opinion’s 
significance was its citation of Conley and its ‘no set of facts’ standard after Twombly. 
However, any speculation about the significance of the Court’s reliance on Conley was 
unwarranted because courts have historically scrutinized pro se prisoners under a lower 
standard. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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clarified this uncertainty.121 In the case, Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani citizen, 
was arrested and detained by U.S. officials following the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks.122 Iqbal brought an action against several federal 
officials—the Attorney General (John Ashcroft) and the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, among others—alleging that these 
individuals had violated his constitutional rights by not affording him 
certain protections guaranteed by the Constitution.123 
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the 
pleading was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.124 The defendants 
filed an interlocutory appeal in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed the district court’s judgment.125 In a 5-4 decision,126 the Supreme 
Court found the complaint to be insufficient, reversing the court below.127 
The Court described the two principles from Twombly: “First, the tenet 
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a 
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. . . . Second, only a complaint 
that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”128 
Essentially, a claim possesses “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”129 Furthermore, the 
Court also explained that the plausibility standard from Twombly would 
apply generally to all civil actions, not just in the case of antitrust 
allegations.130 
Justice Souter, who wrote for the majority in Twombly,131 dissented in 
Iqbal.132 In his dissent, Souter contends that the majority misapplied the 
plausibility standard from Twombly to Iqbal.133 Under Twombly, a 
plaintiff’s complaint, assuming the alleged facts are true, must only state a 
claim for relief which is plausible—i.e. “a plaintiff must ‘allege facts’ that, 
taken as true, are ‘suggestive of illegal conduct.’”134 In Twombly, even 
though the plaintiff alleged parallel conduct, this allegation alone was not 
enough to plausibly amount to conspiracy under the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.135 However, in Iqbal, if the plaintiff’s pled facts were assumed to be 
                                                                                                                                          
 121. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 122. Id. at 1942. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Id. at 1941. 
 127. Id. at 1943. 
 128. Id. at 1949–50. 
 129. Id. at 1949. 
 130. See id. at 1953. 
 131. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548 (2007). 
 132. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 133. See id. at 1960. 
 134. Id. at 1959 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564 n.8). 
 135. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57. 
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true, the plaintiff would, in fact, have plausible ground for relief.136 The 
plaintiff’s allegations did not “stand alone” as “nonconclusory statements” 
in the complaint, as was the case in Twombly.137 
Justice Breyer also wrote a dissenting opinion in Iqbal.138 He agreed 
with Souter’s dissent and joined it,139 but he wrote separately to emphasize 
the need for judicial economy.140 Breyer believed “it important to prevent 
unwarranted litigation from interfering with ‘the proper execution of the 
work of the Government.’”141 
E. AFTERMATH OF THE TWOMBLY AND IQBAL DECISIONS 
The Twombly and Iqbal decisions effectively overturned over fifty 
years of jurisprudence concerning conceivable pleading established in 
Conley.142 In response, members of Congress attempted to return the 
standard from plausibility to conceivability.143 In the Senate, Arlen Specter 
introduced the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 in July 2009.144 The 
text states: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress or by 
an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect 
after the date of enactment of this Act, a Federal court shall not dismiss a 
complaint under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
                                                                                                                                          
 136. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1961–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer posed the following hypothetical 
during oral arguments: 
How does—how does this work in an ordinary case? I should know the answer to this, 
but I don’t. It’s a very elementary question. Jones sues the president of Coca-Cola. His 
claim is the president personally put a mouse in the bottle. Now, he has no reason for 
thinking that. Then his lawyer says: Okay, I’m now going to take seven depositions of 
the president of Coca-Cola. The president of Coca-Cola says: You know, I don’t have 
time for this; there is no basis. He’s—I agree he’s in good faith, but there is no basis. 
Okay, I don’t want to go and spend the time to answer questions.  
Where in the rules does it say he can go to the judge and say, judge, his lawyer will say, 
my client has nothing to do with this, there is no basis for it; don’t make him answer the 
depositions, please? Where does it say that in the rules? 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015), 2008 
WL 5168391 at *5. 
 139. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. (quoting id. at 1953 (majority opinion)). 
 142. See Sullivan, supra note 80, at 1. In Twombly, “the Court abandoned the fifty-year-old ‘no 
set of facts’ standard set out in Conley v. Gibson,” and in Iqbal, “the Court extended the Twombly 
standard to all civil cases filed in the federal district courts.” Id. 
 143. See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009); Open Access 
to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 144. See S. 1504. 
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Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).145 
The Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 has been referred to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.146 In addition, in the House, Representative 
Jerrold Nadler presented the Open Access to Courts Act of 2009 in 
November 2009.147 It reads: 
A court shall not dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6), (c) or 
(e) of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the 
claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. A court shall not dismiss a 
complaint under one of those subdivisions on the basis of a determination 
by the judge that the factual contents of the complaint do not show the 
plaintiff’s claim to be plausible or are insufficient to warrant a reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.148 
The Open Access to Courts Act of 2009 has been referred to the House 
Judiciary Committee and the House Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts and 
Competition Policy.149 While the possibility of success for these two pieces 
of legislation is unclear,150 at the very least they demonstrate Congress’ 
interest in returning to the Conley pleading standard of conceivability.151 
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HEIGHTENED PLEADING 
STANDARDS ON § 11 AND § 12(A) LITIGANTS 
The application of § 10(b) fraud pleading standards and of the Twombly 
and Iqbal decisions to § 11 and § 12(a) claims makes it especially difficult 
for plaintiffs to survive Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.152 An analysis of 
recent court decisions and of current trends in securities litigation illustrates 
                                                                                                                                          
 145. Id. 
 146. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009: Bill Summary & Status, Committees, THE 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN01504:@@@C (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Notice Pleading Restoration Act Bill Status Summary]. 
 147. H.R. 1415. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009: Bill Summary & Status, Committees, THE LIBRARY 
OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR04115:@@@C (last visited Apr. 
11, 2011) [hereinafter Open Access to Courts Act of 2009 Bill Status Summary]. 
 150. Since its introduction in the Senate on July 22, 2009, the Notice Pleading Restoration Act 
of 2009 has only been read twice and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Notice Pleading 
Restoration Act of 2009 Bill Status Summary, supra note 146. Likewise, following its 
introduction in the House on November 19, 2009, the Open Access to Courts Act of 2009 was 
referred to the House Judiciary Committee, then to the Subcommittee on Courts and Competition 
Policy. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009 Bill Status Summary, supra note 149. However, there 
has been no congressional action concerning either of these acts in 2010 and 2011. See Open 
Access to Courts Act of 2009 Bill Status Summary, supra note 149; Notice Pleading Restoration 
Act Bill Status Summary, supra note 146. 
 151. See Congressional bills cited supra note 143. 
 152. See, e.g., In re Bare Escentuals, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 09-3268 PJH, 2010 WL 3893622 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2010); In re Fuwei Films Sec. Litig., 634 F. Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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the difficulties that plaintiffs are facing in court. These difficulties are 
unwarranted given the statutory limitations on § 11 and § 12(a) claims.153 
A. IMPACT OF THE HEIGHTENED PLEADING STANDARDS ON 
RECENT SECURITIES CASES 
The effect of the heightened pleading standards on § 11 and § 12(a) 
cases is exemplified in two recent cases: In re Bare Escentuals, Inc. 
Securities Litigation154 and In re Fuwei Films Securities Litigation.155 In 
Bare Escentuals, plaintiffs brought a securities class action against Bare 
Escentuals, Inc. (Bare), certain current and former directors and officers of 
Bare, and Bare’s investment bankers.156 The plaintiff class alleged that Bare 
violated § 11 and § 12(a) of the Securities Act as well as § 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act.157 Specifically, the plaintiffs charged that Bare was not 
abiding by its “premium” sales restrictions, overstating the profits from its 
“club” program, harming its sales by “cross-selling” non-foundation 
products, and, ultimately, engaging in an alleged “cannibalization” of the 
corporation.158 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).159 To 
examine the legal sufficiency of the claims in this case, the District Court 
for the Northern District of California used the standard of review set forth 
in Twombly and clarified in Iqbal.160 Relying on these precedents, the court 
contended that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his 
entitlement to relief ‘requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”161 
Furthermore, because the complaint based its § 11, § 12(a), and § 10(b) 
claims on the same facts, the court held that the § 11 and § 12(a) claims 
“sound[ed] in fraud.”162 Thus, the court required pleading with particularity, 
per Rule 9(b) of the FRCP, for all three claims.163 
The court evaluated the plaintiff class’s § 11, § 12(a), and § 10(b) 
claims individually and found that each failed to meet the pleading 
                                                                                                                                          
 153. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 154. In re Bare Escentuals, 2010 WL 3893622. 
 155. In re Fuwei Films, 634 F. Supp. 2d 419. But see In re NovaGold Res. Inc. Sec. Litig., 629 
F. Supp. 2d 272, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the heightened pleading standard imposed by 
Rule 9(b) of the FRCP does not apply to § 11 and § 12(a)(2) claims where the “[p]laintiff sets off 
its Securities Act claims in a separate section of the complaint, prefaced with the statement that 
they sound in ‘strict liability and negligence’”). 
 156. In re Bare Escentuals, 2010 WL 3893622, at *1. 
 157. Id. at *9. 
 158. Id. at *5–8. 
 159. Id. at *9. 
 160. See id. at *9. See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 161. In re Bare Escentuals, 2010 WL 3893622, at *9 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 
 162. Id. at *13. 
 163. Id. 
566 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
standards set forth in Twombly and Iqbal and required by Rule 9(b).164 
Ironically, the court distinguished each of these claims by discussing them 
separately, but applied the § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 pleading standards to all 
three claims.165 While it is possible that the plaintiff class failed to 
sufficiently plead the § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim, the complaint alleged 
numerous misstatements based on thirty-one documents distributed by 
Bare.166 These allegations, if presumed true, should have warranted 
providing the plaintiff with at least the opportunity for discovery to 
determine materiality of the misstatements.167 
Furthermore, the court in In re Fuwei Films Securities Litigation 
applied Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard—applicable to 
§ 10(b)/Rule 10b-5—to § 11 and § 12(a) claims in the absence of a 
§ 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 allegation.168 In Fuwei, plaintiffs brought a securities 
class action against Fuwei Films (Holdings) Co., Ltd. (Fuwei), several of 
Fuwei’s directors and officers, and the underwriters for Fuwei’s initial 
public offering.169 The plaintiff class alleged that Fuwei’s registration 
statement presented false information regarding the following two issues: 
(1) “the Registration Statement contained misrepresentations and omissions 
pertaining to Fuwei’s allegedly unlawful acquisition of [a subsidiary 
company]”; and (2) “the Registration Statement contained 
misrepresentations and omissions pertaining to certain arbitration 
proceedings that were pending against Fuwei at the time of Fuwei’s [initial 
public offering].”170 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).171 
Considering the motion, the court employed the standard of review 
established in Twombly and clarified in Iqbal to evaluate the adequacy of 
the claims in this case.172 While the plaintiff class included no allegation of 
fraud in the complaint, the court applied Rule 9(b) to the § 11 and § 12(a) 
claims.173 Here, the court decided to impute a basis of fraud where the 
plaintiff had included no fraud claim in its complaint because the 
“allegations . . . sound[ed] in fraud, and [were] thus subject to the 
heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).”174 This case plainly 
                                                                                                                                          
 164. Id. at *10–25. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at *8. 
 167. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 n.8 (2007) (“[A] plaintiff must ‘allege facts’ that, taken 
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 168. See In re Fuwei Films Sec. Litig., 634 F. Supp. 2d 419, 436–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 169. Id. at 425. 
 170. Id. at 429. 
 171. Id. at 425. 
 172. Id. at 433. 
 173. Id. at 436–37. 
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illustrates the difficulty that plaintiffs face when pleading § 11 and § 12(a), 
even in the absence of a § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim. 
B. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION 
Current trends in securities litigation highlight some interesting results 
with respect to dismissals and the types of claims being brought. 
Cornerstone Research, in conjunction with The Stanford Law School 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, evaluated 3,052 federal securities 
class action suits filed between January 1, 1996 and December 21, 2009.175 
In each year between 1997 and 2008, an average of 197 securities class 
action suits were filed.176 In 2008, 223 of these lawsuits were filed, and in 
2009, 169.177 
Of the resolved (non-continuing) lawsuits in the securities class action 
sample, 54% were settled in 2006, 49% were settled in 2007, and 16% were 
settled in 2008.178 In 2009, none of the resolved/non-continuing lawsuits 
were settled; 100% were dismissed.179 Furthermore, among the sample, 
§ 10(b) claims have declined over the past five years while § 11 and § 12(a) 
claims have increased.180 The percentage of complaints which included a 
§ 10(b) claim was 91%, 87%, 80%, 75%, and 66% for 2005, 2006, 2007, 
                                                                                                                                          
  The Second Circuit has found that, although fraud is not an element of a section 11 or 
section 12(a)(2) claim, “the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b)” applies to such 
claims where a complaint is “premised on allegations of fraud.” Rule 9(b) “is cast in 
terms of the conduct alleged, and is not limited to allegations styled or denominated as 
fraud or expressed in terms of the constituent elements of a fraud cause of action.” 
Accordingly, “a complaint may sound in fraud even where, as here, no fraud claims 
under [section 10(b) of] the Exchange Act are asserted.”  
Id. at 436 (citations omitted). 
 175. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2009: A YEAR IN 
REVIEW 1 (2010), http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2009_YIR/Cornerstone_ 
Research_Filings_2009_YIR.pdf. The research sample consisted of the following:  
[1] These filings include 313 “IPO Allocation” filings, 67 “Analyst” filings, 25 “Mutual 
Fund” filings, 40 “Options Backdating” filings, 23 “Ponzi” filings, and 192 “Credit 
Crisis” filings; the Credit Crisis category includes 21 filings related to auction rate 
securities.  
[2] The sample used in this report excludes IPO Allocation, Analyst, and Mutual Fund 
filings. 
[3] Multiple filings related to the same allegation against the same defendant(s) are 
consolidated in the database through a unique record indexed to the first identified 
complaint.  
Id. at 1. 
 176. Id. at 2. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 22. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 27. 
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2008, and 2009, respectively.181 For § 11 claims, the percentage of 
complaints was 9%, 12%, 19%, 24%, and 26% for 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
and 2009, respectively.182 Likewise, the percentage of complaints with 
§ 12(a) claims was 5%, 9%, 11%, 18%, and 24% for 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, and 2009, respectively.183 
With this data, one could argue that a connection exists between the 
decline in settled cases and the rise in the proportion of § 11 and § 12(a) 
claims. These trends may also correspond with the Twombly and Iqbal 
decisions and the heightened pleading standards placed on § 11 and § 12(a) 
claimants. However, there exists no actual correlation among this data. 
Although, two premises can be derived from this information. First, an 
increase in the proportion of § 11 and § 12(a) claims translates into an 
increase in the percentage of securities litigation cases that will face strict 
pleading standards. Second, a decrease in the amount of settlements 
suggests that the defendants are not afraid to take these securities cases to 
court, and when faced with the possibility of settling against the chance of 
successfully moving to dismiss, defendants have done well with motions to 
dismiss. Ultimately, while this data provides no dispositive conclusion, it 
should be taken into consideration when examining the significance of the 
heightened pleading standards placed on § 11 and § 12(a) claimants. 
C. LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY § 11 AND § 12(A) 
While § 11 and § 12(a) require no showing of intent and can impose 
civil liability on any innocent misstatement (provided that the false 
information was material), a number of limitations on liability can be found 
in these provisions.184 These restrictions cover the scope, damages, and 
timeliness of lawsuits that can arise under these sections.185 Consequently, 
heightened pleading standards for § 11 and § 12(a) claims are unnecessary 
since the claimants already face boundaries on the range of claims that can 
be brought.186 
One of the key factors of § 11 and § 12(a) is that, as provisions in the 
Securities Act, these sections do not apply to the exchange of securities in 
secondary markets.187 As a result, there is a finite number of claimants, and 
this decreases over time as securities offered pursuant to the Securities Act 
enter secondary markets and may, by some point, have little, if any, 
                                                                                                                                          
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a) (2006). 
 185. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a). 
 186. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a). 
 187. See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN, & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES 
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 7 (6th ed. 2009) (“Whereas the Securities Act grapples 
with the protection of investors in primary distributions of securities, the Exchange Act’s concern 
is trading markets and their participants.”). See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k; 77l(a). 
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connection with the initial purchaser and issuer of the securities.188 While 
one could argue that § 12(a) imposes strict liability on a “seller” and that 
“seller” can be broadly construed, the claimant must be in privity with the 
seller.189 That is, the plaintiff must be one of the initial purchasers of the 
securities in order to sue under § 12(a).190 Moreover, even though § 11 
allows a plaintiff to essentially sue anyone who had a connection with the 
production of the registration statement, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that 
the misstatements contained in the registration statement were actually 
material to the plaintiff herself.191 
With respect to damages, a plaintiff under § 11 can recover the 
difference between the purchase price of the securities and either the price 
at which the plaintiff sold the securities or the value of the securities at the 
time of the suit.192 Section 12(a) limits the remedies available to the 
rescission of the purchase of securities, or if the purchase cannot be 
rescinded (i.e. the purchaser no longer owns the shares), then rescissory 
damages.193 In addition, concerning the timeliness of the suits, under § 13 of 
the Securities Act, § 11 and § 12(a) claimants must file suit within one year 
of when the false information was discovered or should have reasonably 
been discovered.194 Unlike other securities statutes (namely, § 10(b)), these 
limitations on the lawsuits that can be filed under § 11 and § 12(a) make 
heightened pleading burdens not only unnecessary but excessive. 
IV. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS TO PREVENT § 11 AND § 12(A) 
CLAIMS FROM FALLING VICTIM TO RULE 12(B)(6) 
MOTIONS  
There are several possible ways to ease the pleading burdens placed on 
§ 11 and § 12(a) claimants. Legislative remedies include amending 
§ 21D(b)(1) of the PSLRA, amending Rule 9(b) of the FRCP, and changing 
the plausibility pleading standard through legislation. Recommendations for 
the Court involve adopting the Eight Circuit’s approach to § 11 and § 12(a) 
claims with respect to pleading and returning to Conley’s conceivability 
pleading standard. 
                                                                                                                                          
 188. See Odorizzi, supra note 63, at 176. 
 189. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a). 
 190. See Odorizzi, supra note 63, at 176; 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a). 
 191. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (“If a plaintiff 
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A. LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES 
1. Amending the PSLRA 
One possible solution is to amend the PSLRA to explicitly limit its 
applicability causes of action alleging fraud. This legislation only affects 
private securities litigation.195 An amendment to § 21D(b)(1) of the PSLRA 
explicitly barring courts from applying this section to non-fraud suits could 
prevent courts from employing the standard of pleading with particularity, 
as required by § 21D(b)(1), to § 11 and § 12(a) claims. However, this alone 
will not prevent courts from applying Rule 9(b) to § 11 and § 12(a) claims 
when such claims “sound in fraud.”196 
2. Amending the FRCP 
Another option is to revise Rule 9(b), making it only applicable to 
pleadings where the claim in question alleges fraud, and perhaps expressly 
stating that all claims not subject to Rule 9(b) are governed by Rule 8. 
Conversely, Rule 8 could also be amended to explicitly include all non-
fraud claims. Nevertheless, neither an amendment to the PSLRA nor to 
Rule 9(b) or Rule 8 would stop courts from evaluating cases using a 
standard of plausibility. 
3. Changing Plausibility Pleading through Legislation 
A third legislative solution would be to change the plausibility pleading 
standard through legislation. Senator Specter’s Notice Pleading Restoration 
Act of 2009 and Representative Nadler’s Open Access to Courts Act of 
2009 would each lessen the current pleading burden on plaintiffs.197 The 
Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 would expressly return the 
pleading standard to conceivability, prohibiting courts from dismissing a 
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(e) of the FRCP unless the 
complaint failed to satisfy the standard set forth in Conley.198 The Open 
Access to Courts Act of 2009 does not explicitly mention Conley.199 It 
requires, rather, that a complaint not be dismissed “unless it appears beyond 
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim.”200 
The Open Access to Courts Act of 2009 also restricts courts from 
dismissing claims for failing to demonstrate plausibility.201 
                                                                                                                                          
 195. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006). 
 196. Even prior to the enactment of the PSLRA in 1995, courts were applying Rule 9(b) to non-
fraud securities claims. See, e.g., Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 892–93 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying 
Rule 9(b) to § 12 claims). 
 197. See Congressional bills cited supra note 143. 
 198. See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 199. See Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
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Nonetheless, this legislation is problematic for two reasons. First, it 
would present new legislation open to the Court’s interpretation. While the 
possibility exists for this legislation to be construed favorably for 
plaintiffs—i.e. consistently with Conley—it also presents an opportunity for 
the Court to interpret these provisions more narrowly than Congress 
intended. The Supreme Court in Twombly rejected “notice pleading” as 
being outdated; the Court could continue with the same opinion in the 
future.202 Second, if the Court found these provisions to be profoundly 
inconsistent with its jurisprudence, it may take the opportunity to strike 
down the legislation as fundamentally unfair to defendants—who arguably 
stand to suffer greater reputational harm from “notice pleading” than from 
plausibility pleading—or possibly contrary to public policy (e.g. in the 
interest of judicial economy). 
B. JUDICIAL REMEDIES 
1. Adopting the Eighth Circuit’s Approach to § 11 and § 12(a) 
Claims 
The most feasible remedy available to § 11 and § 12(a) plaintiffs would 
be for the Court to adopt the Eight Circuit’s approach. The Eighth Circuit is 
the only circuit court to consistently apply Rule 8 of the FRCP to § 11 and 
§ 12(a) claims, regardless of whether they are pled along with § 10(b) 
claims.203 While plaintiffs have petitioned the Supreme Court to resolve this 
circuit split, it has yet to accept a case to consider it.204 
2. Returning to Conley’s Conceivability Pleading 
A second judicial remedy would be to overturn the precedent 
established in Twombly and Iqbal and return to the conceivability standard 
                                                                                                                                          
 202. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561–63 (2007). 
 203. See In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.3d 309, 314 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he 
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in Conley. Given the differences between the justices who joined the 
majority in Twombly and those who joined it in Iqbal, it appears that the 
Court has not reached a solid consensus concerning the plausibility 
standard.205 Justice Ginsburg even publicly disagreed with this precedent, 
stating that “[i]n [her] view, the [Iqbal] Court’s majority messed up the 
Federal Rules.”206 Although, since there seems to be no single voice on this 
matter from a majority of the justices, this is not necessarily a viable, let 
alone timely, remedy for improving the obstacles that § 11 and § 12(a) 
plaintiffs face in court. 
CONCLUSION 
This note has attempted to establish that the application of § 10(b) fraud 
pleading standards under Rule 9(b) and of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions 
to § 11 and § 12(a) claims creates an unreasonably strict pleading standard 
for plaintiffs to overcome. Recent court decisions, current trends in 
securities litigation, and limitations imposed by the provisions of § 11 and 
§ 12(a), illustrate the importance of these changes in pleading standards. 
Ultimately, the most viable solution to this issue would be the Supreme 
Court resolving the split among circuit courts by determining whether 
courts ought to apply fraud pleading standards to non-fraud securities 
claims. 
Amy L. Craiger 
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